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Abstract
There are many legacy code applications that cannot be 
run in Grid environment without significant modifications. 
To avoid re-engineering of legacy code, we developed the
Grid Execution Management for Legacy Code Architecture 
(GEMLCA) that enables deployment of legacy code
applications as Grid services. GEMLCA is an OGSI Grid 
service layer that supports submitting jobs, getting their 
results and status back. Security requirements are essential 
to any Grid application to preserve the confidentiality and 
integrity of data. To meet these requirements the GT3 
security model was implemented in GEMLCA. The paper 
introduces GEMLCA and how Grid Security Infrastructure 
(GSI) components have been added to GEMLCA in order
to enable secure execution of jobs in Grid. The paper also 
presents how a legacy code traffic simulator was
transformed into a Grid service using GEMLCA and gives 
some simulation results.
1. Introduction
Legacy code applications may need additional compute
resources  as a result of the amount of data to be processed
or tasks to be performed. If additional compute resources
are not available, it could be too expensive to purchase and 
maintain them. To avoid this situation, legacy code
applications can be deployed and executed in a Grid
environment to provide access to additional compute
resources . In order to run legacy code applications on the
Grid, the program can be either re-engineered or offered as
a Grid Service without any re-engineering using Grid
Execution Management for Legacy Code Architecture
(GEMLCA).
GEMLCA was developed to support deployment of
legacy code applications as Grid services without
modifying or even requiring access to the original code.
GEMLCA must offer a secure environment to run legacy 
code applications as Grid services enabling only
The work presented in this paper is supported by the “Proposal to 
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authenticated users to submit service requests to
GridServices. To provide GEMLCA security the security
mechanisms of Globus Security Infrastructure (GSI) of 
Globus Toolkit 3 (GT3) was used. Particularly,
applications security is guaranteed at client-, message- and 
server-level using GSI in GEMLCA applications.
Chapter 2 analyses existing solutions to run legacy code 
applications in Grid environment. Chapter 3 describes
GEMLCA introducing its architecture and how it works. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview how security is implemented 
in GT3. In Chapter 5 we explain how security was realised
in GEMLCA. Chapter 6 introduces the implementation of 
GEMLCA. In Chapter 7 we present some simulation
results.
2. Using Legacy Code in Grid Environment
Many large industrial and scientific applications are
available today that were written well before Grid
computing or service-oriented approaches  appeared. To
integrate these legacy code programs into service-oriented
Grid architectures with the smallest possible effort and the
best performance, is a crucial point in more widespread 
industrial take-up of Grid technology.
There are several research efforts aiming at automating
the transformation of legacy code into a Grid service. Most 
of these solutions are based on transformation of legacy 
code applications into Web services outlined in [1], and 
use Java wrapping in order to generate stubs automatically. 
One example for this is presented in [2], where the authors 
describe a semi -automatic conversion of legacy C code
into Java using Java Native Interface (JNI). After wrapping 
the native C application with the Java-C Automatic
Wrapper (JACAW) MEdiation of Data and Legacy Code
Interface tool (MEDLI) is used for data mapping in order 
to make the code available as part of a Grid workflow.
Different, non-wrapping approaches are presented in [3]
and [4] but these solutions only define the principles of
legacy code transformation and do not specify an
environment or a tool to do the automatic conversion.
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Compared to Java wrapping GEMLCA is based on a
different principle. It offers a front-end Grid service layer 
that communicates with the client in order to submit
service requests, manage input and output parameters, and 
contacts a local job manager through Globus MMJFS
(Master Managed Job Factory Service) to submit the
legacy computational jobs. To deploy a legacy application 
as a Grid service there is no need for the source code and
not even for the C header files as in case of JACAW. The 
user only has to describe the legacy parameters in a pre -
defined XML format. The legacy code can be written in 
any programming languages and can be not only a
sequential but also a parallel MPI or PVM code that uses a 
job manager like Condor and where wrapping can be
difficult.
3. GEMLCA
GEMLCA is an architecture that supports deployment of 
legacy code applications as Grid services without re-
engineering the original code. GEMLCA is based on OGSI
[5] and GT3 [6] infrastructure. However, the concept of 
GEMLCA is more generic and can also be applied to other 
service-oriented architectures. Using different platforms 
the communication and the actual service implementation 
is different, but the concept of the architecture remains the 
same. This way the transition to new emerging standards 
like Web Services-Resource Framework (WSRF) and GT4 
will be straightforward. 
GEMLCA has been designed as a three-layer
architecture: the first layer, the front-end layer, offers a set 
of Grid Service interfaces that any authorized Grid client 
can use in order to contact, run, and get the status and any 
result back from the legacy code. This layer hides the
second layer, the core layer, which deals with each legacy 
code environment and their instances as Grid legacy code 
processes and jobs. The final layer, the back -end is related 
to the Grid middleware where the architecture is being
deployed. All three GEMLCA layers were developed by 
the Centre of Parallel Computing, University of
Westminster. The GEMLCA environment uses either
Globus Fork or Condor [7] as a job manager. To utilise
GEMLCA with other Grid middleware than GT3, like GT4 
or a “pure” Web Services based approach, only the back-
end layer has to be modified.
A GEMLCA resource is composed of a set of Grid 
services that provides a number of Grid interfaces in order 
to control the life-cycle of the legacy code execution. This 
architecture can be deployed in several user containers or 
Tomcat application contexts.
In order to access a legacy code program, the user
executes the GEMLCA Grid Service client which creates a 
legacy code instance with the help of the legacy code
factory. Following this, the GEMLCA resource submits the 
job to the compute server through GT3 MMJFS using a 
particular job manager. 
Figure 1 presents the GEMLCA implementation and its 
lifecycle. The scenario for submitting legacy code jobs
using the GEMLCA architecture is composed of the
following steps:
(1) The user signs his/her certificates to create a Grid user 
proxy. The proxy contains the user’s Grid credential 
to be delegated by the GEMLCA Grid services to 
MMJFS for the allocation of resources.
(2) The Grid Service Client, using the Grid Legacy Code 
Process Factory (GLCProcessFactory), creates a Grid 
Legacy Code Process (GLCProcess) instance where 
the initial process legacy code environment is set and 
created using the GEMLCA file structure.
(3) The Grid Service Client sets and uploads the input 
parameters needed by the legacy code program
exposed by the GLCProcess and deploys a job using a 
Resource Specification Language (RSL) file and a 
multiuser/instance environment to handle input and 
output data.
Figure 1. GEMLCA Lifecycle Management
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(4) If the client credential is successfully mapped,
MMJFS contacts the job manager that allocates
resources and executes the parallel legacy code in a 
computer cluster.
(5) As far as the client credentials are not expired and the 
GLCProcess is still alive, the client can contact
GEMLCA for checking job status and retrieve it at
any time.
Finally, when the Grid Service instance is destroyed, the 
multi-user/instance environment is cleaned.
The description of the GEMLCA class structure and
implementation of its classes are given in [8].
4. GT3 and Security
The Globus Toolkit uses GSI [9] to enable
authentication, to implement authorization and to support 
secure communication over a computer network. GT3
provides a set of security components based on GSI to 
implement various security mechanisms in Grid
applications. GSI provides three levels of security for Grid 
applications: server-side security, message-level security 
and client-side security. 
The client-side security is based on authentication,
authorisation and credential delegation. A user can use all 
or a subset of these security measures before sending a 
service request.
Users have to create Grid user proxies to authenticate 
themselves. They sign their certificates while they are
creating their Grid user proxies. The user proxy enables
single sign-on in Grid environment. Signing the service
request means that the user’s Grid certificate and signature 
are attached to the request. Users can use either the Secure 
Message handler or the Secure Conversation Message
handler to sign/encrypt service requests .
The user can also configure the authorization mechanism.
Authorisation is used to determine when a user has a right 
to access a resource and perform a job. GSI manages
authorization by reading the user’s identity (or identity 
certificate) from the user proxy and maps this identity to a 
local identity. Currently, three authorization methods are
supported by GSI: none, self, and grid-map. The “none”
mechanism implies that authorization will be disabled on 
the server side. The “self” mechanism means that only
clients with the same identity as the service are allowed to 
access the Grid service. The “grid-map” mechanism
implies that grid-map file authorization is performed.
The credential delegation enables a Grid service to utilise
the user’s credential in order to invoke other services on 
the user’s behalf. Therefore, a Grid service is able to set the 
delegated credentials as its identity before contacting other 
Grid services. Credential delegation with user proxy
supports single sign-on in Grid applications. GSI provides 
different delegation modes: full proxy delegation, limited
proxy delegation  or no delegation. To activate the
credential delegation the service stub must be configured. 
To complete the delegation some security code must be 
also added at the beginning of all Grid services’ methods. 
This code enables the Grid service to check the user’s
identity in order to authenticate it to other Grid services. 
So, when a Grid service receives a user’s request, it
forwards it to the MMJFS. The MMJFS identifies the
client who sent the request.
GT3 offers two message-level security modes: GSI
Secure Session mode and GSI Secure Message mode [10].
The GSI Secure Session approach creates a security
context with the server before requesting a Grid service. In 
contrast, the GSI Secure Message approach does not create
a security context before sending a message. The message-
level security uses WS Security, XML Encryption and
XML Signature standards to provide security between Grid 
clients and Grid services. 
To implement the message-level security and to send 
requests to Grid services the Secure Conversation Service
handler, the Secure Message handler and the Secure
Conversation Message handler are used as client-side
security handlers. A user has to pass information to the 
client-side handlers on what type of security to use. In the 
Secure Session Mode the Secure Conversation Service
handler establishes a security context (or session) through a 
secure conversation assigned to the Grid service to which 
the client wants to communicate. The handler ensures that 
a security context is established whenever it gets a message 
from the client indicating that session-based security is 
required. After establishing the secure session the handler 
passes the client’s request to the Secure Message handler.
The handler encrypts and/or signs the message with user’s
credentials using the security context. In the Secure
Message mode the Secure Convers ation Message handler’s 
task is to sign and/or encrypt messages. GSI uses the
WS-Security client handler on the client side to receive 
responses  from Grid services. The main task of the
WS-Security client handler is to verify and decrypt any 
encrypted and/or signed messages.
At the server-side when a request arrives for a Grid 
service, the WS-Security handler, the Security Policy
handler, the Authorization handler, the Secure
Conversation Message handler and the Secure Message
handler may be invoked to check the security information 
of the request before forwarding it to the Grid service. The 
first three handlers manage incoming service request while
the last two handlers deal with outgoing responses. First, 
the WS-Security handler checks whether the request is 
encrypted or signed. Secondly, the Security Policy handler 
controls whether the request meets the security
requirements of the service. Finally, the Authorisation
handler checks whether the client is authorized to invoke 
the service. If the request has successfully passed all three 
handlers, it is sent to the requested Grid service for
processing. In the GSI Secure Session mode the Secure 
Conversation Message handler encrypts and/or signs
messages using the established security context before
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returning the reply. In the GSI Secure Message mode the 
Secure Message handler encrypts and/or signs messages 
before sending the response.
The server-side security is provided through service
authorisation and credential management. The security is 
specified via the security deployment descriptor and the 
security configuration file. The security deployment
descriptor defines how to configure authentication methods 
and run-as identities to access Grid services. It is loaded 
when a Grid service is activated. The security
configuration file specifies how each method of a Grid 
service must be accessed. The specification is given by an 
XML file and a pointer should be added to the deployment 
descriptor to point to this file.
5. GEMLCA Security Model
GEMLCA legacy code applications should be run as Grid 
services allowing only authenticated users to submit
service requests  and authorised users to access compute 
resources . To achieve the required security the client-side
should incorporate authentication, authorization and
credential delegation. The server-side security is
implemented through service authorization, service
credentials and credential delegation. Figure 2 presents the 
GEMLCA security model.
The GEMLCA Resource must be configured with service 
credentials given in the security configuration file to assign
identity to Grid services. GEMLCA also uses the security 
configuration file to define how methods of Grid services 
must be accessed using authentication and how methods to 
be run with the user’s security identifier. GEMLCA utilises
the grid-map authoris ation mechanism in order to control
access to Grid services. When a service request reaches a 
Grid service, the service request handler checks the
grid-map file to control if the user is authorised to access 
the Grid service. A client is authorized to access the Grid 
service if it has an entry in the grid-map file.
The user has to set up the authentication and
authorisation modes. To ensure that the service is executed
on the user’s behalf, credential delegation mode must be 
also activated at the client side. The GEMLCA Client has 
to sign its credential with its certificate and set up full 
delegation mode. To do it a user must create a Grid user
proxy that makes the user’s credentials available in calls to 
the Grid service factory. The credential tells the Grid
service that the user allows using its credential to invoke 
other services on its behalf. Thus, the Grid service will be 
able to use the delegated credentials as its identity before 
contacting other services. Through proper security
configuration the credential will be delegated by the Grid 









a. Security Deployment Descriptor
<parameter name="securityConfig" 
value=“my-security-config.xml"/>






















   ((stub)gemlca)._setProperty(Constants.
      AUTHORIZATION,NoAuthorization.
getInstance());
firewall
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On Fig. 2 the client generates a Grid user proxy signing it
with its certificate. The proxy is used to authenticate the 
user to a Grid service. Having the proxy, the client
generates a service request describing the job to be
executed on its behalf and signs the request with its proxy.
If the user wants to ensure privacy, it can encrypt the
service request. The user sends the signed and/or encrypted 
service request as a message to the GEMLCA Service
Factory. To increase the security a firewall is installed
between the Grid Client and Grid Service Factory.
When a Grid service receives a service request first, it 
verifies the request’s signature to authenticate the user.
Secondly, the Grid service checks if the user is authorised 
to access the Grid service. If the user has the required 
authorisation and the credential delegation mode is set, the 
job request is forwarded to MMJFS. The MMJFS submits 
the job to the compute resource, for example to a cluster, 
where it is executed on behalf of the user.
6. GEMLCA Implementation
The GEMLCA is implemented by deploying a set of Grid
services, which represent GEMLCA Resources, and tested 
by using secure Grid clients.
The Grid client is a Java program executed by the Java 
Virtual Machine from a Grid portal based on P-GRADE
Grid portal. The GEMLCA Resource and MMJFS are
deployed in two separate Java servlet engine containers, 
particularly in Tomcat web application contexts hosted by 
a single Tomcat server running on the Westminster GT3 
master node.
The architecture presented in Chapter 3 requires a
specific job manager such as  Fork, Condor or Sun Grid 
Engine to be configured for submitting computational jobs 
to clusters. Condor is selected as the job management 
facility for the Westminster cluster and it requires the
Condor job manager interface to be installed and
configured as well as the GT3 master node to be
configured as a submit host to the Parsifal Condor pool. 
The default installation of GT3 only installs the Fork job 
manager and an additional step is required to install and 
configure Condor, which is bundled with GT3.
GEMLCA uses GSI to enable user authentication and to 
support secure communication over a Grid network. A 
GEMLCA client needs to sign its credential and also to 
work in full delegation mode [11] in order to allow the 
GEMLCA environment to work on its behalf in order to
Figure 3. MadCity in P-GRADE environment
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create the legacy code environment and pass the user’s 
Grid credential to MMJFS.
GEMLCA has two levels of authorisation. The first level 
is implemented by the grid-map file mechanism. The
second level is defined by a set of legacy codes that a Grid 
Client is allowed to use. The set is composed of a
combination of a general list of legacy codes, available to 
anyone using a specific GEMLCA resource, and a user
mapped list of legacy codes, only available to Grid clients 
mapped to a local user by the grid-map file mechanism.
GEMLCA administers the internal behaviour of legacy 
codes taking into account the requirements of input files 
and output files in a multi-user environment, and also 
complies with the security restrictions of the operating 
systems where the architecture is running. In order to that, 
GEMLCA is using GEMLCA itself in a protected mode
composed of a set of system legacy codes in order to create 
and destroy a unique process and job stateful environment 
only reachable by the local user mapped by the grid-map
file mechanism.
7. Traffic Simulation Using GEMLCA
The MadCity traffic simulator was used as legacy code
application to be run as a Grid Service through GEMLCA. 
MadCity traffic simulator [12] was developed by the
research team of Centre of Parallel Computing, University 
of Westminster.
MadCity simulates traffic on a road network and shows 
how vehicles move on roads and at junctions. It consists of 
the GRaphical Visualiser (GRV) and the SIMulator (SIM) 
tools. The GRaphical Visualiser helps to design a road
network file. The SIMulator models the movement of
vehicles using the road network file. After completing the 
simulation, the SIM creates a trace file, which is loaded on 
GRV in order to display the movement of vehicles.
The computational performance of the simulator depends 
on a number of parameters, such as number of vehicles, 
junctions, lane cut points and roads. The road network can 
contain thousands of vehicles, roads and junctions. SIM 
uses a simple set of rules to compute the new position and 
state of each vehicle taking into account its current position 
and the road network.
The SIM of the MadCity traffic simulator was
parallelised using Parallel Grid Run-Time and Application 
Development Environment (P-Grade) [13]. A pipeline
template was used where all nodes perform the same task 
simulating different segments of the road network. Four
children nodes participate in the traffic simulation on
Figure 3. The reason for using the pipeline template was its 
scalability; i.e. the number of nodes could be decreased or 
increased using the template attribute window without
modifying the code.
To run MadCity as a Grid Service, the user has to create 
an XML-based Legacy Code Interface Description File
(LCID) [14] that specifies the legacy code to be run, the 
job manager to be used, maximum/minimum number of 
job/processes and parameters required by the legacy code.
The LCID file is added to the list of available legacy codes
in the front-end layer. After adding the LCID file of the 
MadCity traffic simulator to the list of available Grid
Services any Grid client, who has the required
authorisation, can select and run the traffic simulator.
The performance results generated by the parallel version 
of MadCity traffic simulator as Grid Service in GEMLCA 
environment are given in Figure 4. The performance results 
are similar to performance results produced by the

























Figure 4. Simulation Results
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8. Conclusions
GEMLCA environment was created to make existing 
legacy code applications available as OGSI Grid Services.
The GEMLCA environment offers a set of OGSI
compliant interfaces in order to create, run and manage 
Grid services that offer all the legacy code application 
functionality without changing the legacy code. GELMCA 
adds a software layer to existing Grid middleware like GT3 
and provides an integrated Grid execution lifecycle
environment for end users, such as chemists,
meteorologists, etc.
GEMLCA security measures are based on GT3 GSI
model. GEMLCA security offers single sign-on capability 
for submitting jobs, uploading input data and downloading 
output data using credential delegation and user’s Grid 
certificate.
The parallel version of the MadCity traffic simulator was
used as a legacy code application in the GEMLCA
environment in order to test the architecture. It was proved 
that running the simulator as a Grid service did not require 
any re-engineering, only an XML based description file has
to be created.
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